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ABSTRACT: In the text the author tries to investigate Wittgenstein’s notions
of action, practice and pragmatism in his book On Certainty. An attempt is
made to sketch the criterion of Wittgenstein’s analysis of certainty and to de-
fine the crucial concepts such as world-picture, practice, certainty and justifica-
tion. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein applies a specific form of pragmatic
solution to the problem of justification, which after all, can and should be
called a kind of pragmatismus. This is the subject of the first and the second
part of the text. The third part shows the application of this pragmatic theory
of justification to Wittgenstein’s refutation of scepticism. The author suggests
that his pragmatic analysis of certainty presents an adequate means for the
refutation of scepticism. However, his anti-scepticism is situated in the tradi-
tion of common sense and ordinary language philosophy and epistemology
(Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer, Austin, Grice, Strawson, etc.). In the conclusion
the author applies this anti-sceptical solution to the so called rule-following
problem (as stated in Kripke’s work) and shows that there are some far reaching
consequences of this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later work to his position
on language, learning, ontology and knowledge.
KEY WORDS: Knowledge, justification, world-picture, practice, pragmatism,
certainty, doubt, scepticism.
So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism.
Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung.
(OC 422)
1. Wittgenstein’s pragmatic analysis of certainty
[1.1.] G. E. Moore argued not just against idealism, but against Hume’s
scepticism as well, especially in his papers “Refutation of Idealism” and “A
Proof of an External World” (1939). His positive account was presented in
the paper “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925). The point of his defence
was, generally speaking, clear enough because he was speaking of an ordi-
nary man who insists that the validity of our everyday claims to knowledge is
not open to serious doubt, enabling such an ordinary man to achieve knowl-
edge (at least of so-called common sense truisms). In the On Certainty Witt-
genstein tried to answer Moore’s claims about an ordinary man with a right
to knowledge. There is a possibility that Wittgenstein sometimes discusses
Moore’s text, and sometimes N. Malcolm’s paper “Defending Common
Sense”, which Malcolm read to him in 1949. Wittgenstein’s general point
was that sceptics and idealists were claiming too little, and Moore was
claiming too much. In opposition to the sceptics, Wittgenstein holds that the
sceptics cannot give sufficient reasons for their doubts. In opposition to
Moore, he argues that Moore’s common sense propositions cannot be
known, but are nevertheless almost absolutely certain, at least for practical
purposes. We must ask here what is Wittgenstein’s reason for such a claim.
The fundamental reason is this: the use of the word ‘knowledge’ is reserved
only for special occasions, certain context, circumstances, intentions or gen-
erally speaking for certain everyday epistemic situations. It does not mean
that knowledge is relative, but that it seems to be so. There are some conse-
quences of this view. The first consequence is that the general account or
analysis of knowledge is eo ipso impossible. The second consequence is that
even knowledge is impossible outside of certain everyday epistemic situa-
tions, so Wittgenstein was forced to speak of certainty in the same way as
Moore and the rest of us speak of knowledge (especially when we wish to
refer to empirical knowledge). In that and some other points, Wittgenstein’s
position is quite similar not just to Moore’s, but also to Austin’s.
[1.2.] In that context Wittgenstein offers an analysis of certainty, not of
knowledge, and it is similar to a standard analysis such as this: S is certain
that p iff: (1) p is true (p), (2) S is (subjectively) sure that p (SSp) and (3) S
has a right to be sure (objectively) that p (SRSp). Here I use Ayer’s analysis
of knowledge because it is terminologically closest to Wittgenstein’s vocabu-
lary (Ayer, 1990: 31–35). I used the term subjectively in condition (2) because
of the clear distinction between certain propositions for which ground must
be available, and other propositions for which grounds are not and cannot
be available (the distinction was made by Moravetz and followed by Klein,
1984: 117-122). On the other hand, in the assertion of condition (2) the word
“subjectively” is always implicit or never expressed because of Wittgenste-
in’s view on the nature of belief. He says that the concept of belief is inter-
nally linked with how people would act in certain circumstances and with
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what people would say they believe. Using the “right to be sure” condition is
an explicit commitment to a normative account of knowledge, familiar not
just to common sense and critical cognitivist epistemology, but previously
also to Kant (1964: 120). So, the question is what entitles us or what gives us
the right to hold p. Wittgenstein tends to analyse the condition (3) in the fol-
lowing manner: the fact that S has the right to be sure that p can only mean
that S is objectively sure that p. In Wittgenstein’s case that means that: (3.1)
p is for S practically indubitable in virtue of its direct or indirect grounding
in certainties of the world-picture (SRSp›CWP). This analysis of certainty
has been common to all interpretations of the On Certainty in the last two
decades. Of course, they differ in many things, but in certain features the in-
terpretations are almost identical (for example, we have strict epistemologi-
cal, normative, pragmatic, educational, feminist and other types of interpre-
tation). Furthermore, this analysis is especially interesting in the light of the
satisfaction of the condition (3). The question is: From which source does S
earn his right to be sure? And the answer is: S is objectively sure that p,
which means that for S p is practically indubitable (this category because of
its practicality is not subsumed under H. Frankfurt’s regress of indubitability).
The ultimate answer about practical indubitability of p for S lies within Witt-
genstein’s fundamental insight, which says that: (3.2) Practical indubitability
is an intrinsic characteristic of the certainties of the world-picture (CWP).
The indubitability is intrinsic in order not to hinge the propositions of the
CWP, but rather to our actions and practices. In this way the whole of Witt-
genstein’s analysis of certainty (which can only be called knowledge under
certain circumstances) stands up or falls down depending on the answer to
the question: What kind of certainties are these CWP, so that they may have
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this intrinsic certainty? In this text, I would like to try to lay down some ele-
ments of the answer to this question, and as it seems to me that the most
crucial element is in fact Wittgenstein’s category of action. Thus: (3.3) Epi-
stemic category of practice is the end of all of our justifications, giving evi-
dence and reasoning.
[1.3.] First we must try to introduce some order into Wittgenstein’s notes.
Thus, I propose a certain categorisation of paragraphs in the light of themes
that are central to the book (following almost all commentators). Here we
must sketch a general epistemic construction, which Wittgenstein was trying
to explicate and describe.
THEME SECTION
World-picture 83, 87–89, 92–97, 99, 102–105, 108, 117, 135, 136, 138, 140–147, 152, 156, 162,
167–169, 172, 185, 188, 208–210, 225, 233, 234, 235, 238, 247, 248, 262, 266,
274, 276–279, 292, 293, 312, 332, 333, 440, 492, 493, 512, 514, 517, 558, 600,
603, 609–611,613, 629–631
Knowledge-belief 2, 6, 8, 11–14, 16, 23, 42, 84, 85, 89, 90, 112, 113, 141, 159, 161, 165, 166, 169,
170, 172, 173, 177, 179, 180–182, 218, 230, 241, 242, 243, 246, 253, 260, 263,
267, 272, 288, 289, 290, 291, 306, 313, 326, 327, 328, 347, 349, 351–353, 355,
357, 361, 364–367, 369, 376–382, 408, 415, 417–420, 424, 426–444, 459–469,
477–480, 482–490, 499, 500, 502–505, 510, 534–552, 555–557, 561, 564–569,
574, 576, 577, 582–593
Doubt-uncertainty 2, 4, 10, 19, 24, 56, 114, 115, 117, 120, 121–123, 125, 126, 127, 151, 154, 160,
219–224, 232, 247, 249, 255, 261, 280, 398, 310–312, 315, 316, 331, 334, 337,
338, 341, 343–346, 354, 356, 357, 392, 425, 456, 458, 480, 490, 495, 496, 519, 525
Certainty-indubitability 7, 8, 30, 47, 77, 111, 114, 115, 128, 129, 147, 174, 183–185, 194, 217, 233, 245,
250, 269, 270, 273–275, 284, 285, 298, 308, 331, 340, 342, 358, 394, 404, 416,
425, 470, 490, 492, 511, 519, 522, 524, 579, 608, 628
Moore-type propositions 1, 3, 4, 6, 10, 19, 20, 21, 25, 32, 35, 36, 40, 41, 52, 53, 57–61, 84–86, 91, 92, 93,
100, 112, 116, 125, 137, 151, 155, 171, 178, 202, 264, 268, 306, 325, 371–374,
386–390, 397–407, 412, 413, 423, 424, 451, 462, 481–482, 520–521
Possibility of error, rule
and checking
5, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25–27, 32, 43, 44, 51, 54, 66–77, 79–82, 98, 109–110, 138,
158, 163, 164, 194, 195, 300–302, 304, 309, 318–321, 367, 425, 494, 506–507,
572, 574, 597–599, 632–637, 648–667, 673–675
Sceptical hypothesis 19, 23–24, 35, 37–39, 54–56, 59, 75, 101, 102, 106–107, 118, 119, 134, 153, 157,
162, 190, 191, 203, 214, 215, 217, 218, 226–228, 237, 257–259, 279, 281, 282,
286, 314, 322, 383, 391, 420–421, 450, 472, 473, 497, 498, 513, 517, 558, 578,
594, 595, 600, 613, 614, 615, 616, 624–627, 632–643, 647, 676
Circumstances, situation 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 44, 46, 62, 111, 133, 176,237, 255, 260, 326, 334, 335, 348,
349, 350, 445, 553, 552, 553, 554, 603, 620, 622
Arguments, justification,
reliability, evidence,
Rationality
18,22, 23, 34, 46, 48, 66, 112, 137, 105, 130, 131, 132, 148, 149, 150, 175, 173,
188, 189, 192, 196–201, 203–206, 231, 243, 250, 252–254, 261, 270,, 271, 279,
287, 294–296, 302, 303, 307, 315, 322, 323, 324, 336, 359, 432, 438, 444, 445,
452–454, 474, 483, 484, 491, 504, 508, 509, 515, 561–563, 571, 575, 577, 580,
599, 600, 604, 608, 612, 620, 669, 672
Language-game, form
of life
3, 7, 18, 21, 24, 63, 62, 64, 65, 204, 255, 256, 283, 315, 317, 329, 344, 370, 392,
393, 396, 403, 446, 455, 457, 477, 492, 493, 501, 509, 512, 514, 519, 523, 524,
534, 554, 555, 558, 564, 566, 579, 593, 596, 599, 603, 609, 610, 611, 613, 617,
618, 619, 620, 628, 629–631, 637, 646
Action, practice,
Pragmatism
9, 45, 47, 49, 110, 120, 124, 139, 140, 148, 196, 204, 212, 229, 232, 251, 297, 338,
339, 360, 362, 368, 395, 409, 410, 411, 414, 422, 431, 450, 475, 476, 501, 519,
524, 600, 601, 603, 609–611, 613, 629–631, 668–669
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[1.4.] Now we can illustrate how complicated it is to defend such a construc-
tion of Wittgenstein’s attempt. Firstly, because there are those themes that
Wittgenstein considers not to be central, but marginal; and yet, they are cru-
cial for the understanding of central themes. Secondly, it is very hard to
differentiate the role of his arguments. For example, sometimes he uses
irony to refer to the sceptical challenge, and sometimes the same figure of
speech to refer to Moore’s common sense truisms. Thirdly, the same crucial
concepts appear in many different, sometimes even incompatible, roles dur-
ing his struggle with Moore and the sceptic. The best way to show this is to
give a preliminary categorisation mentioned above.
2. Analysis of Praxis and Weltbild
in On Certainty
[2.1.] Now we must pay attention to the paragraphs that emphasise practice.
In the OC, we can find at least thirty paragraphs in which Wittgenstein ex-
plicitly or implicitly discusses the category of practice. However, there are
some differences in vocabulary, so that in some cases he speaks about:
(1) “Way of acting” [action, act] (OC 110, 148, 196, 204, 232, 360, 368, 395,
409, 411, 431).
(2) “Practice” [practical] (OC 120, 139, 451, 524).
(3) “Doing” (OC 339, 363).
(4) “Way of behaving” (OC 284), and even of
(5) “Pragmatism” (OC 422).
Here I must add that these differences are not just a symptom of the rich-
ness of vocabulary and epistemic language games, but are principally the
symptoms of the richness of everyday epistemic situations and practices.
However, what is more important is the fact that these paragraphs can be
arranged in a manner that can clarify Wittgenstein’s position on the nature
of justification and knowledge. Let us suppose that the conditions (1) and
(2) of p’s certainty for S are satisfied and that we are confronted with the
question of satisfaction of the condition (3), or with the question, as was pre-
viously established – from which source do the certainties of WP emerge?
So, let us suppose that p is true, that S is sure that p, and that S has some
chain of reasoning, or some evidence, or something else which can serve as a
reason for his right to be sure.
p  SSp  SRSp (right to be sure [reason])  ?
The question is where does the chain end. Interestingly, Wittgenstein’s an-
swer is simple. The chain continues as follows:
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Its blindness (4)
 SRSp  CWP (p1, p2, p3, …pn) (1)  practice (P) (2)
Its epistemic power (3)
[2.2.] The chain stops at some element of CWP (but always at the whole
WP) (1), and the whole WP (1) is rooted in our everyday practice (2), which
reveals our WP and cuts the chain of justification (reasoning, giving evi-
dence, rationality, language, meaning, etc.). There are two features of prac-
tice, which Wittgenstein emphasises greatly: its epistemic power (3), and its
blindness (4). These characteristics are pivotal for his view. The former, be-
cause it reveals not just our epistemic or conceptual, but also and primarily
our human limitations; and the latter, because it reveals the seriousness of
our concept of indubitability for practical purposes which is positively situated
in our WP. Let’s take another way round and examine the solution. If some of
our practices (2), are (3) and (4), then they show what we are convinced of (1)
and that shows where the chain of justifications must end. From the outside, it
is always the practice that is at the end of the chain, and from the inside, there
is always a question of how close we are (under the variables of certain every-
day epistemic situations) to the core or to our world picture. Here we can in-
terpret the concept of ‘everydayness’ anthropologically, e.g. as a kind of home
if we want to stress the non-propositional account of certainty and “hinge
propositions” (Cavell, 1989). Finally, it shows why in any specific case we have
a right to be sure, why we are sure and that certain p is in that virtue certain
for us beyond all reasonable doubt for practical purposes. To conclude this
part, if the circumstances of everyday epistemic situation are given and if we
identify them, and then if someone questions our right to be sure, we can call
it knowledge in order to say something like: “Your doubt is quite silly at the
moment.” Of course, there are some problems with the nature of the WP,
with its change throughout the discoveries, with new knowledge which is not
clearly grounded in it and finally with the certainties that turn out wrong
(Glock, 1997: 76–81, 336–341). This interpretation, however, is compatible
with Kober’s interpretation (1996: 415–416). Kober thinks that the justifica-
tion can be achieved by practice itself, thus practice is not just the end of a
chain of justifications but also a justification itself. This is very important be-
cause there is a difference in saying: (1) That the practice is that which stops
the chain of justification from the outside, and in saying: (2) That the practice
is itself the last part in the chain of justification. In the scheme: C = certainty,
K = knowledge and P = practice:
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Within a practice P of a community, knowledge claim K1 can be justified by
another knowledge claim K2, etc. On the other hand, practices have their in-
ternal ways of justification (PI 325). For example, the claim of competence
in repairing something can be justified by actually repairing it (Kober, 1996:
416). Nevertheless, the certainty of P depends on our description of P in
given circumstances.
[2.3.] In the previous part we have described four main elements: the world
picture (1), practice (2), its epistemic power (3) and its blindness (4). Now it
seems to be an appropriate time to summarise these elements of Wittgen-
stein’s “survey” [or a “surveyable comparative representation” (Z 273)] of
condition (3).
[2.4.] (a) WORLD-PICTURE. Sure evidence we accept as sure (OC 196),
our not doubting the whole WP, is simply our way of judging and acting (OC
232), from their actions we can see what people are convinced of (OC
284–5), we act with certainty that knows no doubt (OC 360), the proposi-
tions of the WP are certain because they are the foundations of all our
actions (OC 414), we show this knowledge by our actions, and sometimes it
can be expressed in the form of knowledge (OC 431, 524, 609–12, 668–9).
There has been some discussion of the nature of certainties of the WP or the
so-called “hinge propositions”. It is clear that these propositions only look
like ordinary empirical propositions, but they are not propositions at all.
They are rather something closer to rules, such as a rule of testing, or a rule
of instruction (Stroll, 2002). Some commentators read even the concept of a
rule as a norm, and a norm as evaluation (Kober, 1996; OC 308, 473, 634,
167). Another important point about the world-picture (CWP) is that it is
acquired socially or communally because the society, and not the individual,
is the primary knower (Caraway, 2002). However, the world-picture or the
“hinge propositions” consist of four types: (1) trans-historical, (2) those that
change with time, (3) personal propositions applicable to each person, and
(4) person-specific propositions that are part of a subjective world-picture
(Glock, 1997: 78). Wittgenstein made a variety of claims regarding the na-
ture of these hinge-propositions or CWP. (1) They are certain for every-
body. (2) They can under certain circumstances be wrong. (3) Trans-
historical hinge-propositions are basic propositions. (4) Some of the hinge-
propositions exemplify Gricean conversation implicatures, since their nega-
tion is nonsensical, and (5) they cannot be neither justified nor doubted,
since their certainty is presupposed in all judging (OC 308, 494, 614; Glock,
1997: 78–79). However, CWP can be regarded as propositions, hinge-
propositions, quasi-propositions, or even the body of a matrix of common
knowledge. The last interpretation is the closest to Moore’s category of
common sense (Larm, 1997: 1–5). There is no problem with having the
world-picture, but there is a problem with its change (Strawson, 1992: 68).
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[2.5.] (b) PRACTICE-ACTION (AS THE END OF JUSTIFICATION).
The end of justification is: ‘ungrounded’ way of acting (OC 110), giving
grounds, however justifying the evidence, comes to an end… it is our acting
which lies at the bottom of the language-game (OC 204), our action gives us
a right to regard a reason as the sufficient reason (OC 212). Behind that,
there are no reasons but only: practice, decisions, guarantees, slogans, con-
versions, persuasions, and names like “fool” or “heretic” (OC 609–11, 669).
[2.6.] (c) PRACTICE (ITS EPISTEMIC POWER). Practice eliminates doubts
(OC 120), this is how we act (OC 148), by practice we learn the WP (OC 44),
knowledge is displayed in practice and it is the direction of practice (OC
363, 395, 409–11).
[2.7.] (d) PRACTICE (ITS BLINDNESS). The practice speaks for itself
(OC 139), our practice gives meaning to everything else [including language]
(OC 229), children learn practices (to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.)
(OC 476), and finally, it is a kind of pragmatism and we are being thwarted
by a kind of Weltanschauung (OC 422). The blindness of practice is con-
nected also with the concept of drilling the CWP and parallel practices into
the members of epistemic community (in fact children) and that explains:
why CWP cannot be doubted of justified (OC 110, 125, 243, 282, 307, 563),
why CWP can be analysed as norms (OC 308, 321, 494), why it is nonsensical
to claim the CWP explicitly [OC 237, 347–350, 409, etc.] (Kober, 1996: 437).
Some commentators even read the “hinge propositions” as educational
propositions (Moravetz, McGinn, Okshevsky and others).
[2.8.] This is how and in virtue of what we have the right to be sure. This is
the way we work as epistemic beings. From this centre we can correctly ex-
plicate other themes from the OC such as: knowledge, belief, world-picture,
doubt, certainty, Moore-type propositions, rules, sceptical hypothesis, situa-
tion, circumstances, perspective, community, context, form of life, language-
game, holism, etc. It is impossible to go into these themes here, but we can
mention, for example, the consequences of this analysis of Wittgenstein’s so-
lution of the sceptical problem (following Kenny, 1975, 1987; Kober, 1996;
Stroll, 1994, 2002; Glock, 1997, etc.). In that context, the epistemological or
even the sceptical problem is solved (Kenny, 1975: 203–15, 1987). (1) Doubt
needs grounds (OC 323, 458, 519). (2) Doubt must be directed at something
and must show its practical consequences (OC 120, 247, 338, 428). (3)
Doubt presupposes a language-game (OC 114, 306, 457, 458). (4) Universal
doubt is impossible (OC 115, 160, 232, 310–315, 450). (5) Doubt presup-
poses certainties of a world-picture (OC 115, 125, 163, 337, 341, see Kober,
1996: 411–441; Glock, 1997: 336–341). This last insight is the most important
but it is not new. In fact it is similar to the classical transcendental argu-
ments against scepticism: “The sceptic’s doubts are incoherent, since for
them making sense tacitly presupposes the conceptual framework which
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they explicitly attack” (Glock, 1997: 340). In addition, we can say that it is
now easier to approach other, specifically anti-sceptical themes such as the
dreaming hypothesis (Malcolm; Kenny; Stroll, 2002: 143–146), alleged prag-
matism (Putnam, 1996: 27–57) or even foundationalism. In the next section,
we will return to this question.
[2.9.] However, I would not want to go as far as some commentators did and
say for example that Wittgenstein was undoubtedly a pragmatist in the OC.
On the other hand, something is clear, at least for me. I attempted to show
that Wittgenstein tried to put his “linguistic” philosophy on certain non-
linguistic grounds. If the analysis is correct, then it might uncover some dis-
turbing consequences for the interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
From the perspective of the OC (and the PI) it really is correct that Wittgen-
stein abandoned the so-called “semantic ascent” (or “linguistic turn”, G.
Bergmann, which M. Dummett recognised in Frege’s The Foundations of
Arithmetic, §62; for discussion see Glock, 1999). W. V. O. Quine seems to be
right when in the last paragraph of his book Word and Object (§56) he
accuses Wittgenstein of abandoning the semantic ascent. Yet, if we can posi-
tively label Wittgenstein’s later position, we can call it the “pragmatic de-
scent” or a descent into concrete situations, to examples, to practice or sim-
ply to activities, routines and habits of life. Of course, there is some evidence
for this interpretation. Firstly, Wittgenstein called his position pragmatis-
mus, and secondly, he used examples not just as illustrations of complicated
theories, but also primarily as the very core of the philosophical practice.
This is incompatible with the theory of “language game”, but only at first
sight, because a language game is essentially a social phenomenon and a
kind of social activity (Krkaè, 2002a, 2002b). Wittgenstein’s solutions are
nevertheless influential in current contextual-falibilistic epistemologies (see
for example Williams, 2001: 254).
[2.10.] If we want to know whether Wittgenstein was a pragmatist and in
what sense of the word, it will be best to look at his concept of philosophy. In
this text, I am presupposing that for Wittgenstein philosophy was something
like a practice of giving overviews. I am forced here to compress the discus-
sion on the nature of philosophy.
(1) Philosophy is critical (TLP 4.11, 6.53), therapeutic (PI 133, 254–5; BT
407–10; Z 382) and educational or even self-educational (OC 549; Krkaè,
2002c: 47–94) activity, practice and skill (TLP 3.324, 4.112; PI 118–9; RPP I,
115; OC 402; CV 6–7) of giving surveyable comparative representations as de-
scriptions (TLP 4.11; PI 81, 92, 108, 131, 133, 189, 254–5, 599; Z 273) of the
things in question (and not just of language use).
(2) Of course, and it is central to Wittgenstein’s concept of the nature of philo-
sophical task, philosophy makes us capable – of seeing connections [Zusam-
menhänge sehen] (PI 122), of making overview [Übersicht] and of appealing to
everydayness (…as home, Cavell, 1989: 32–33). This home is something like the
untouchable background which for Wittgenstein consists in a series of meta-
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phors: bedrock, the scaffolding of our thoughts, that which stands fast for all of us,
rock bottom, the substratum of all my inquiring, unmoving foundations, etc.
(Stroll, 2002: 82).
(3) Therefore, not only do we have two concepts of philosophy: philosophy as a
therapy and philosophy as an overall understanding (Kenny, 1987: 39), but
rather three concepts – and the third was based on his pragmatism. However
there is also a dominant critical characteristic of philosophy. “All philosophy
can do is to destroy idols.” In addition, “that means not creating new ones – for
instance as in the ‘absence of an idol’” (CV 131). Wittgenstein sometimes even
professed to convert us to a new point of view (CV 61). However, in Zettel he
tries to explain the difficulty of the nature of philosophical method: “People
sometimes say they cannot make any judgement about this or that because
they have not studied philosophy. This is irritating nonsense, because the pre-
tence is that philosophy is some sort of science. People speak of it almost as
they might speak of medicine” (Z 447–460).
Language game is essentially a social phenomenon and a kind of social ac-
tivity, so it is clear that the meaning is grounded not just in a non-linguistic
phenomenon, but also in the practice of “speaking a language” (language
games as well as forms of life). Pragmatic descent was a methodological doc-
trine, which Wittgenstein did not apply in his early philosophy (TLP) but he
was aware of its significance. In the middle part of his philosophy (or the
transitional period) he tried to apply the pragmatic descent to the analysis of
language and meaning, and finally, in his late philosophy he applied the doc-
trine to the areas such as religious belief, philosophy of psychology, aesthetics
and epistemology. The application was gradual and it is most explicit in the
OC. If we want to think about philosophy in this way, it seems that we are
certainly committed to some kind of pragmatism. However, if we want to be
sure about this, we must remind ourselves of the pragmatic maxim. There
are a few, slightly different, formulations of the maxim. C. S. Peirce formu-
lated the maxim this way: Consider what effects, which might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conceptions to have.
Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of these
objects. W. James formulated it thus: To develop a thought’s meaning we
need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for
us its sole significance.
[2.11.] Moreover, Dewey has argued that when one is confronted with in-
compatible goals, when one has to choose how to live and what to live for,
what is at stake is not a difference of quantity (of good), but what kind of
person one is to become, what sort of self is in the making, what kind of a
world is making. Pragmatistic outlook thus is not preoccupied with causes or
calculations but with different ways of living. “Thus a knowledge of one’s
own strengths and weaknesses will play a role in making a wise choice” (Put-
nam, 2001). Pragmatism in that light tends to see philosophy as art of learn-
ing, teaching, educating, and self-educating (Cavell, 1989; Putnam, 1999).
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Finally, if we compare Wittgenstein’s epistemic principles to the pragmatic
maxim (in Peirce or in James or in Dewey), then we could say that it is a
kind of pragmatismus after all. On the other hand, explication of this thesis is
surely something of an “inclination to fight windmills”, because it is impossible
to say what needs to be said, it is only possible to show it in action (OC 400).
3. Did Wittgenstein refute scepticism?
[3.1.] Now we come to the central question: Is there a cash value of his prag-
matism? Alternatively: did he refute scepticism? Wittgenstein thought care-
fully about epistemological question in all of his major works and both
phases of his development. Nevertheless, the most important work is, of
course, the OC. Some commentators think that there is a kind of continuity
in his confrontation with epistemological questions, but we shouldn’t take
this kind of investigation very seriously, as it is a question of intellectual bio-
graphy, and not a philosophical problem. On the other hand, some philoso-
phers take the question of possibility of epistemology very seriously (even
Dancy, 1985: Ch. 15). Nevertheless, if the task of answering the sceptic’s
challenge were the most fundamental task in epistemology, and if we failed
to give an adequate answer, epistemology would surely be impossible. We
cannot answer this question a priori or deduce it from some self-evident
proposition. Instead, we must try to refute the sceptic and then see if episte-
mology is possible (or engage in some project, which is ignorant of the scep-
tical problem, as for example is naturalised epistemology).
[3.2.] On the one hand, Wittgenstein was attached to dogmatism when hold-
ing on to his philosophical solutions. Maybe it is the only constant of his
philosophical method. However, we cannot be blind to his obvious open-
endedness, especially in later works. The method was almost Socratic and
works like dialogues of Plato. However, where are the characters of the
play? For example, sometimes it looks to me as if there are at least four
characters (actors) in his dialogue On Certainty. These are: Wittgenstein
himself as quasi-Socrates, various common men, G. E. Moore (sometimes as
N. Malcolm), a Cartesian sceptic, and even more actors, such as (some-
times) Wittgenstein from the 30’s, W. James, B. Russell, and others. The
fact is that during the late 40’s he was reading Russell, James (again, be-
cause as a young man he had read Varieties of Religious Experience) and es-
pecially Moore and Malcolm. This evidence and an obvious influence of
these philosophers gave him an idea of a combination of pragmatism and
common sense. Thus, in the conceptual centre of the OC we have two
groups of propositions: (1) On Praxis and (2) On Weltbild (shown above:
1–2). The combination of these two groups of insights is the core of his ap-
proach to scepticism.
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[3.3.] In the TLP we can find some parts of his later, more systematic refuta-
tion of scepticism. He rejects scepticism as nonsensical (TLP 6.5–6.51).
There are some consequences of this position: (1) Sceptic is not wrong, but
nonsensical, so there is no point in engaging in discussion with him and (2)
there can be an answer only if there is a question to be asked. Because there
is no question, there is no answer, thus, any talk about scepticism must be
nonsensical. If we take another way round, then it is clear that: (3) Certainty
makes sense only where we can speak of something (later he will argue that
certainty is at the bottom of a language-game). (4) If we can speak of some-
thing, then the proposition expressed can be true or false and there is some
space for doubts. In the PI, he makes some steps towards the sceptical prob-
lem. He is talking about fire that will burn him if he puts his hand in it – and
that is sure. In that case, we can see not the meaning of the word “certi-
tude”, but rather what certainty in fact is [for real] (PI 474). Here we can see
Moore’s border between the subjective and the objective in certainty, be-
tween theoretical and practical certainty. In the second part of the PI, it
appears as if Wittgenstein was trying to correct his position from the TLP
saying something like: there must be a kind of hypothesis where the doubt is,
and that doubt must come to an end (PI II 180). Later he writes that a kind
of certainty is a kind of language-game (PI II 224). Later he explicitly ap-
peals to practice as the criterion of certainty (PI II 225). Thus, what is im-
portant is how certainty shows itself in our practice.
[3.4.] Finally, in the OC he develops an idea of certainty (for a general intro-
duction see: Ayer, 1985; Kenny, 1975, 1987; Schulte, 1989; Morawetz, 1987).
There are at least five distinctive elements that Wittgenstein uses as a point
of departure in discussion with the sceptic. (1) The basis or reasons for
doubt (OC 323, 458, 519). (2) The specific direction of doubt, because if
doubt must show some practical consequences, then it cannot be universal.
In other words, a doubt must be relevant for our lives (OC 120, 247, 338,
428). (3) That doubt can exist only inside of a language-game is a very im-
portant insight because Wittgenstein develops an idea from the PI (II 224),
which is an improvement for the TLP and the thesis of nonsensical nature of
sceptical doubts (TLP 6.5–6.51). Doubt also presupposes a language-game
and it is a plain fact that if we presuppose that nothing is certain or that every-
thing is uncertain or even open to doubt, then this also applies to the words
we use. In one sense he is being ironical when he is asking: What is the way
of introducing the doubt to a language-game? In other sense it is the funda-
mental question: How did we learn to doubt after we had learned some-
thing? But it is a psychological question why a child doubts this proposition,
and not that one (OC 114, 306, 457, 458). (4) Universal doubt is impossible
for different reasons. Firstly, because it must be stated in some language,
and if it is, then we must be sure what the words of this language mean. In
that way, doubt always presupposes something as certain. Wittgenstein uses
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examples with children when they are accustomed to some part of world-
picture (OC 115,160, 232, 310–315, 450). (5) The last insight is that doubt in-
cludes certainty. Again, it is an answer to a radical view from the TLP (6.5)
because: “One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that
one does not doubt.” “That is to say, the questions that we raise and our
doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt,
are as it were like hinges on which those turn.” “That is to say, it belongs to
the logic of our investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted”
(OC 115, 125, 163, 337, 341).
[3.5.] What should we say about this treatment of scepticism? It is in the tra-
dition of common sense epistemology (starting even with Locke and the
Scottish school and going all the way to Moore and Austin) to defend the
possibility of knowledge of everyday empirical propositions. Therefore, what
they are saying is simply that the sceptical arguments stemming from the dif-
ferences in perception are not conclusive, because they contradict the cer-
tainties of our world-picture, and thus they must be wrong. Moore made a
similar argument against Hume (Moore, 1959). On the other hand, when we
are talking about the universal or global and radical scepticism, Wittgenstein
refused the argument because of its lack of practical consequences. There
are two kinds of universal sceptical argument that are directed not just
against empirical propositions or knowledge based on perception, but also
against knowledge based on self-evidence, evidence to memory, on self-
consciousness, on reasoning, etc. These Cartesian arguments are based on
the ‘malicious demon hypothesis’ and on the ‘dream hypothesis’. Wittgen-
stein implicitly discusses first one and explicitly the second one.
[3.6.] Here I would like to try to broaden the discussion of anti-scepticism in
such a way as to include all of the ordinary language arguments against scep-
ticism from the 50’s (Wittgenstein, but also Austin, Grice, Strawson, etc.).
However, there is also a long and parallel tradition of using transcendental
arguments against scepticism (Wittgenstein, Strawson, and even Putnam in
his famous “Brains in a vat”, 1981: 1–21). The examples given form only a
part of that long tradition, but I can only mention some names, insights and
concepts of knowledge here.
(1) Firstly, one says that knowledge claim is some kind of guarantee or warrant
and a performative utterance (J. L. Austin, see Lehrer, 1978: 52–55, 1995:
27–28, Brusovich, 2002). In this way, sometimes called the “Performative the-
ory of knowledge”, we must concentrate on how the speaker comes to be in a
position to know and what the speaker’s authority or credentials for claiming to
know are.
(2) Secondly, one says that there are conversational implicatures of a sentence
(statement) which cannot be inferred from the explicit literal statement, but
can be inferred from the way the statement was made (choice of words, tone,
etc.). The statement “I have two hands” is obviously true, so there must be
some special circumstances to express such a statement. In normal circum-
stances, I am just wasting everyone’s time (Grice).
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(3) Thirdly, one says that our usage of the words like “normal”, “ordinary”,
“commonly” and other similar words is in fact an appeal to everyday situations,
circumstances and everyday practices as the final justification of our way of life
and of the whole body of our common knowledge (L. Wittgenstein; see Glock,
1997).
(4) Commonsensism (G. E. Moore) is the view that we know most, if not all, of
those things which ordinary people think they know and that any satisfactory
epistemological theory must be true to the fact that we do know such things.
Common sense beliefs are all beliefs that people generally hold in a certain historic
period, and those beliefs that particular men hold and it is impossible for them
not to hold those beliefs. Reid suggested that common-sense belief is every
belief, which is: (1) universally held by mankind, (2) whose acceptance is
reflected in the common structure of all languages, (3) whose contradictory is
not merely false but absurd, and (4) which is irresistible, so that even those who
question them are compelled to believe them when engaging in the practical
affairs of life.
(5) R. M. Chisholm’s version of critical cognitivism exemplifies some features
of commonsensism. He assumes that we know certain facts about the material
objects around other minds, the past, and ourselves and that any satisfactory ac-
count of the criteria of knowledge must be adequate to this fact. Critical cogni-
tivism goes beyond commonsensism in: (1) offering a positive account of how
we know common-sense propositions, and (2) holding that there are just four
sources of our knowledge: external perception, memory, self-awareness and
reason. It asserts: (1) that we know facts about external world, other minds and
the past, (2) that we have no other sources of knowledge, and, therefore, (3)
our knowledge of external world, other minds and the past is yielded by these
four sources.
(6) This tradition of thinking about knowledge in vocabularies of common
sense (and critical cognitivism) and in terms of everydayness was flourishing
throughout the entire 20th century. The next step, at least in epistemology and
theory of justification, was contextualism. Contemporary contextualist episte-
mologists recognise their heritage in philosophies, visions and arguments of
Reid, Moore, Wittgenstein, Austin, Grice, Chisholm, Strawson, etc.
The Cartesian Dream Hypothesis claims that one cannot distinguish the
dream episodes from the veridical ones, and thus that for any moment t, one
can never know with sufficient certainty that one is not dreaming. Conse-
quently, nothing is absolutely certain (Descartes thought that cogito [pense]
is the answer). Therefore, if we take the cogito seriously (as for example
Husserl did in his Cartesian Meditations), then we cannot doubt our own ex-
istence, but the question remains how is it possible to know anything about
the world from this point. Moore tried to answer differently by stating that
he knows many things for certain (Moore: “Certainty”). To prove such
things he must prove that he is not dreaming at the moment and he admits
that he could not prove this. But, he said that if he knows that he is (for ex-
ample) standing, then it follows that he is not dreaming at that very moment.
T. Nagel situated Moore’s epistemology among heroic theories, which ac-
knowledge the Great Gap and try to leap across it. “The fourth reaction is to
turn one’s back on the abyss and announce that one is now on the other side.
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This was done by G. E. Moore” (Nagel, 1986: 69). Finally, Moore stated that
he knows that he is standing. The argument is valid if we allow a distinction
between (1) knowing the proposition and (2) proving the proposition.
[3.7.] It is important that Moore thought that he had to answer the sceptic
because the sceptic’s doubts were serious. Wittgenstein thought that this
doubt was not serious. There is an obvious reason for such a claim. “It is
obvious that we do not always insist that people know they are not dreaming
before we allow that they know something in everyday life… So it can easily
look as if Descartes reaches his sceptical conclusion only by violating our or-
dinary standards and requirements for knowledge…” (Stroud, 1984: 40).
Stroud is against such interpretation of the sceptical approach to knowledge
and he finds this kind of refutation of scepticism in Austin (“Other Minds”,
1961, “Sense and Sensibilia”, 1962), Dretske (“Epistemic Operators”, 1971)
and Nozick (Philosophical Explanations, 1981). The obvious fact is that from
the perspective of everyday life and everyday epistemic situations, circum-
stances and context, these alternatives, such as the dream hypothesis or the
brain in a vat hypothesis, are epistemically completely irrelevant. If someone
cannot accept such reasons, as Stroud can’t, then it is understandable that
he tries to ask inappropriate questions about, for example, Austin’s “pro-
cedures” which are in fact Wittgenstein’s “practices”, and about Austin’s
“recognised ways” which are in fact Wittgenstein’s “forms of life” (Austin,
1961: 55–57; Stroud, 1984: 46–47). Here we can recall Unger’s distinction
between absolute terms and relative terms and the theory of relevant alter-
natives. Generally speaking, (1) if someone approaches an interpretation of
the sceptical question from the point of view of absolute terms, he will surely
end in the Cartesian problem (with The Great Gap). (2) But if that someone
approaches an interpretation of the sceptical question from the point of
view of relative terms, he will have to presuppose a certain background of
meaning of the terms in question, and of the relevant parameters of episte-
mic situation (and of course the relevant alternatives like “cleverly disguised
mule” in famous F. Dretske’s Zebra-case). Now, I cannot see why the latter
approach is in any way worse than the former. Acknowledgement of the
relevance of the context of an epistemic situation is very important. The
revival of arguments from ordinary knowledge claims from the 50’s (Austin,
Wittgenstein, Grice, Strawson, etc.) is in fact a contemporary contextualism
(Stine; Cohen; see Sosa, 1990: 171–182). It is not completely clear what
Wittgenstein’s approach to scepticism was. Of course, on the one hand his
approach was similar to that of other philosophers of ordinary language.
Some even suggested that he used the transcendental argument against
scepticism (Strawson).
[3.8.] Let’s go back to Wittgenstein’s solutions now that we can see its con-
text. His approach in the OC is similar to the one to scepticism in general in
the TLP. The point is that the sceptic’s challenge (“How do you know that
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you are not dreaming right now?” or “I may be dreaming”, as Wittgenstein
stated it) cannot be sensibly stated and therefore there is nothing to refute
(Z 369; OC 350, 676). In Putnam’s words (from the argument that uses the
sameness of reference for brains in a vat and thoughts of someone in the
actual world, 1981: 13-14), if this is only a dream, then “This is only a
dream” is false. And it is false, because if this is just a dream, then there is
no reality, and if it is so, there cannot be language entry rules and language
exit rules. However, there are some attempts of reconstruction of Wittgen-
stein’s objection to the Dream Hypothesis (Stroll, 2002: 145). From this
argument, Wittgenstein rejects not only sceptical hypothesis, but Moore’s
proof of an external world as well.
[3.9.] The last interesting detail is Wittgenstein’s insistence on the psycholo-
gical dimension of certainty. In virtue of that he speaks about calm certainty
and certainty which still struggles. This dimension is not about evidence or
practice, but indeed about our assent to the whole of the world-picture.
After all, this view of certainty was of almost no interest to contemporary
philosophers. Wittgenstein suggested that this dimension is very important –
thus we must think over the possibility of connection of this insight with psy-
chology of attitude change (I have in mind the theories about rationalisa-
tions, changing of cognitive parts of attitude, etc.), because it is important to
understand the changes in the world-picture. However, there is no strict ar-
gument from this dimension, even though Wittgenstein sometimes suggests
that it is also psychologically impossible to doubt the certainties of the
world-picture (cats like milk) and even some propositions that are obviously
incompatible with the world-picture (cars don’t grow from the ground).
After all, psychologically speaking, this is important for the explication of
the phenomenon of being wonder-struck in situations in which the world-
picture is even slightly changed. How men reacted when they discovered
fire, when they invented the wheel, when they saw the New World, when
they realised that it is possible to change the social and political order, when
the first man landed on the Moon, etc. It is miraculous and frightening to
see that the picture of the world is changing and that nothing would be the
same again. In Wittgenstein’s metaphor, it is like a river that is changing its
route and also changing the riverbed (which can be taken as our common
place, our everydayness as home). What is changed or moved are not the
parts, but rather the whole world-picture, the whole way of life. It is one
thing to explain the change of the world-picture and corresponding prac-
tices, and quite a different thing to justify universal doubt in its certainties
when there is no special reason to do so.
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4. Conclusion: the connections between rules, practices as
the applications of rules and world-picture (CWP)
We have showed:
(1) what is the core of Wittgenstein’s pragmatic position from OC which is the
practice itself and certainties implicit to it (first part),
(2) of what kind is this analysis of certainty as analysis of “knowledge” (of eve-
ryday hinge-propositions, second part),
(3) and how he refuted scepticism on the basis of this position (third part).
However, there are some more general and far-reaching consequences of
this position not just for the interpretation of his philosophy, but also for the
interpretation of some of the central questions of philosophy. There are
some lessons from the OC on the so-called rule-following problem. These
consequences are mainly ontological, which means that they at the same
time answer the question of learning the WP and the question of rule fol-
lowing. It is impossible even to sketch the rule-following problem here, but
the fundamental consequence of all things previously said for this problem is
that the WP can be learned only by means of practice as a rule-governed
activity. “The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a
kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the
game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules”
(OC 95). Pseudo-propositions of the WP can be learned through practice in
forms of life. As the understanding of a rule is given by practice of its follow-
ing, the knowledge of a world-picture is in the same manner implicit in prac-
tice of its learning. “It might be imagined that some propositions, of the
form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels
for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this
relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard
ones become fluid” (OC 96). Pseudo-propositions are principles of judging,
principles of action, etc. However, some are more fundamental than others
are.
“The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of
thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters
on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp
division of the one from the another” (OC 97). There is no strict distinction
between the CWP, practice and the forms of life. “And the bank of the river
consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an impercep-
tible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed
away, or deposited” (OC 99). Thus, rules are incorporated in their applica-
tions as well as their understanding, so there is no problem of interpretation
or understanding of a rule or a rule-following problem. However, from the
point of view of significance of empirical propositions of the world-picture,
the question is how the rule and the empirical proposition merge into one
57K. KRKAÈ: Wittgenstein’s anti-sceptical weapons
another (OC 309). The answer is that it is the core of practice – that practice
masks the distinction between rules and empirical propositions (OC 319).
Abbreviations
TLP = Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
LP = Lectures on Philosophy
BB = The Blue and Brown Books
R = Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics
PI = Philosophical Investigations
CV = Culture and Value
RPP = Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I, II
Z = Zettel
BT = The Big Typescript
OC = On Certainty
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Miriše na pragmatizam:
Wittgensteinova antiskeptièna oru®ja
SA®ETAK: U tekstu autor nastoji istra®iti Wittgensteinove pojmove djelovanja, prakse
i pragmatizma iz njegove knjige O izvjesnosti. Nastoji se ocrtati kriterij Wittgensteino-
ve analize izvjesnosti i definirati kljuène pojmove poput slike svijeta, prakse, izvjes-
nosti i opravdanja. Analiza pokazuje da Wittgenstein primjenjuje specifièan oblik
pragmatiènoga rješenja problema opravdanja, koji se na kraju krajeva mo®e i treba
nazvati nekom vrstom pragmatizma. To je predmet prvog i drugog dijela teksta. U
treæemu se dijelu pokazuje primjena ove pragmatiène teorije opravdanja na Wittgen-
steinovo opovrgavanje skepticizma. Autor sugerira da je njegova pragmatièna anali-
za izvjesnosti prikladno sredstvo za opovrgavanje skepticizma. Meðutim, njegov je
antiskepticizam smješten u tradiciju filozofije i epistemologije zdravoga razuma i
obiènoga jezika (Moore, Chisholm, Lehrer, Austin, Grice, Strawson itd.). U zakljuè-
ku autor primjenjuje ovo antiskeptièko rješenje na tzv. problem slijeðenja pravila
(kako je izlo®en kod Kripkea) i pokazuje da postoje dalekose®ne posljedice ove
interpretacije Wittgensteinova kasnog djela na njegova shvaæanja jezika, uèenja,
ontologije i znanja.
KLJUÈNE RIJEÈI: Znanje, opravdanje, slika svijeta, praksa, pragmatizam, izvjes-
nost, sumnja, skepticizam.
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